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ESCAPE OUT THE BACK DOOR OR 
CHARGE IN THE FRONT DOOR: U.S. 
REACTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
RosEANN M. LAToRE* 
Abstract: In the last days of his administration, former President 
Clinton made the United States a signatory to the Rome Treaty for the 
International Criminal Court, an unexpected move that allowed the 
United States to continue to participate in the shaping of the court. 
However, the signature neither indicated approval of the court nor the 
United States' willingness to be a full participant in it. Instead, many 
arguments against the participation of the United States exist, and the 
chances of ratification by the Congress are slim. This Note analyzes the 
United States' attempts to exempt itself from the Rome Treaty and the 
arguments against the United States' participation. The Note argues 
that the United States' participation in the ICC is necessary and 
appropriate to its position in the international community and supports 
the United States' full participation through ratification of the Treaty. 
INTRODUCTION 
In February 1999, United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan told delegates assembled from countries throughout the 
world, "[t]he best chance humankind had ever had to end the culture 
of impunity was within grasp ... We must not let it fall. "1 Annan made 
his statement during the first meeting of the U.N. Preparatory Com-
mission for the International Criminal Court (PrepCom) in order to 
urge nations to sign the treaty establishing the International Criminal 
Court (ICC or the Court).2 Surely no country could take issue with 
the establishment of a permanent, impartial, international court to 
try those accused of genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and 
* Roseann M. Latore is the Solicitations Editor & Symposium Chair of the Boston Col-
lege International & Comparative Law Review. 
1 U.N. Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court Begins FiTst Session, M2 
PRESSWIRE, Feb. 17, 1999, available at1999 WL 12605515 [hereinafter First Session]. 
2 See id. 
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crimes against humanity.3 In particular, a country with a history of 
commitment to trying war criminals, a country whose own legislative 
body voted in 1994 "to encourage the establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court within the United Nations system," would seem 
especially disposed towards supporting such a court.4 Despite the U.S. 
Senate's vote in support of the ICC,5 and President Clinton's call in 
1997 for the establishment of such a court,6 the United States refused 
to sign the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (RSICC 
or the Treaty) in 1998.7 This refusal put the United States in the com-
pany of states such as Iraq and China, other countries that refused to 
sign the Treaty at the Rome meeting.8 Former President Clinton did 
sign the Treaty at the eleventh hour, allowing the United States to 
continue to influence the development of the court.9 Clinton vowed 
not to send the Treaty to Congress for ratification, however, without 
major revisions, and recommended that his successor follow the same 
course of action.IO 
One of the United States' main arguments against becoming a 
full participant in the ICC is that an overzealous prosecutor who dis-
agrees with U.S. policies could bring U.S. military personnel before 
the court.ll The United States' desire to protect U.S. service members 
from ICC prosecution is so strong that the House of Representatives 
passed, and the Senate is considering, the American Service Mem-
ber's Protection Act of 2001 (ASPA), which would withhold aid to 
3 See Benjamin Ferencz, A Prosecutor's Personal Account: From Nuremberg to &me, 52 J. 
INT'LAFF. 455,455 (1999), available at 1999 WL 32962031. 
4 Jim Anderson, U.S. Shies Away From International Criminal Court, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR,July 18, 1999, available atWL 7/18/99 DCHPA 22:33:00. 
s /d. 
6 Ferencz, supra note 3. 
7 U.S. at Odds with Global Criminal Court, DESERET NEws, June 12, 2000, atA02, available 
at 2000 WL 22773324 [hereinafter U.S. at Odds]. 
8Jd. 
9 See Public Statement on the &me Treaty on the International Criminal Court, PuB. PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS, available at LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter Public Statement]; 
State Department Regular Briefing, FED. NEws. SERV., Jan. 2, 2001, available at LEXIS, News 
Group File [hereinafter Briefing]. 
to See Public Statement, supra note 9. 
II See Anderson, supra note 4; Elizabeth Neuffer, War Crimes Tribunal Adopted as U.S. 
Votes 'No,' BoSTON GLOBE, July 18, 1998, at AI, available at 1998 WL 9143924; Jeremy 
Rabkin, This Court Would be Criminal; Congressional Republicans']ust War on the International 
Criminal Court, WKLY. STANDARD, June 26,2000, at 19, available atLEXIS, News Group File. 
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countries that are parties to the ICC.l2 This bill could cripple, if not 
effectively destroy, the ICC.I3 
This Note discusses the current status of the ICC and the United 
States' attempts to be exempted from it, both before and after the 
United States became a signatory to the Treaty. Part I discusses the 
background that led to the convening of U.N. delegates in Rome in 
1998. Part II explains the U.S. position on the ICC and its desire for 
exemption, including its efforts at the June, 2000 meeting of Prep-
Com. It also examines the ASPA and its effect on the ICC. Part III ar-
gues that the United States should ratify the Treaty and that the ASPA 
should not pass Congress. Finally, this Note argues that the United 
States must heed the will of the international community, abandon its 
policy of unilateral action in international affairs, and participate fully 
in the ICC. 
I. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
A. Early Attempts to Create an International Criminal Court 
Attempts to create an international criminal court have been 
made for centuries.l4 One of the first cited international courts tried 
Peter Von Hagenbush in 1474 for crimes against "God and man" dur-
ing his military occupation of a civilian community in Austria.15 
The attempts were more focused in the years between the First 
and Second World Wars. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles called for the 
prosecution of war criminals, permitting ad hoc tribunals to adjudi-
cate alleged war crimes.16 While no international tribunals were estab-
lished pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles, there were some national 
prosecutions in German courts,l7 Article 277 of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles specifically called for the prosecution of William II of Hohen-
zollern, the Emperor of Germany.18 Other articles allowed for ex-
panded prosecution of other individuals who shared responsibility for 
12 Delay Amendment to Protect American Service Members Passes Overwhelmingly, PR NEws-
WIRE, May I 0, 200 I, available at LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter Amendment Passes]; see 
Rabkin, supra note 11, at I9. 
13 See Amendment Passes, supra note I2. 
14 See jEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION OF THE United NA-
TIONS 55-62 (2000). 
15 /d. at 55-56. 
16 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 6-7 (I998); MORTON, sttpranote I4, at 56. 
17 BASSIOUNI, supra note I6, at 6-7. 
18 MoRTON, supra note I4, at 56. 
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the war.19 Out of a list of 896 drawn up by the Allies, however, Ger-
many only tried twelve.2° The German Kaiser escaped prosecution by 
fleeing to the Netherlands, where the Dutch refused to extradite 
him.21 
The Treaty of Sevres, ending the war with Turkey in 1920, also 
called for the prosecution of war criminals, but no trials ever took 
place.22 National prosecutions were held in other countries, such as 
Canada, France, and Israel.23 The League of Nations also tried to es-
tablish an international court to enforce the 1937 Terrorism Conven-
tion, but the eruption of several world crises prevented it from doing 
so.24 
B. Post-World War II Developments 
Efforts to establish an international criminal court became more 
widespread in scope in the years following World War II. 25 Mter World 
War II, the Allies advocated the punishment of individuals responsible 
for war crimes.26 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo 
prosecuted German and Japanese individuals for "crimes against 
peace," "crimes against humanity," and "war crimes."27 There were 
questions, however, about the impartiality of the judges, who were 
drawn from Allied countries, and about the fairness of these tribunals' 
retroactive jurisdiction.28 While these trials began the process of ap-
plying international law to protect fundamental human rights,29 they 
also demonstrated the need for a more permanent, authoritative body 
of laws to facilitate effective and systematic prosecution of war crimi-
nals.30 
19 !d. 
20 !d. 
21 Id. at 56--57. 
22 Id. at 57. 
23 BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 8. 
24 I d. at 10-11. These included the Spanish Civil War, Italian invasions, and German 
aggressions. See id. 
25 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 10-11; MoRTON, supra note 14, at 57-60; see also Fer-
encz, supra note 3, at 455. 
26 MoRTON, supra note 14, at 30-31. 
27 BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 7. 
28 MoRTON, supra note 14, at 31. 
29 See generally Ferencz, supra note 3. 
30 MoRTON, supra note 14, at 31. 
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The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia at the Hague and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda at Arusha (the Tribunals) reflected the desire of the in-
ternational community to use international tribunals to prosecute 
those responsible for violating the laws of war. 31 The Tribunals were 
undermined, however, by the fact that they had difficulty arresting 
those indicted. 32 This ineffectiveness resulted in decreased public 
confidence in the Tribunals, and prevented them from serving as a 
deterrent to other offenders.33 The U.N. Security Counsel reached a 
point of "tribunal fatigue," as the time and effort required to support 
the Tribunals in order to ensure their credibility and effectiveness 
strained the resources of the U.N. 34 
The idea of an international criminal court had been discussed 
in the U.N. throughout the years between World War II and the 1998 
Rome Convention.35 Between 1947 and 1989, General Assembly-
mandated committees sought to formulate the principles of interna-
tional law developed at Nuremberg and prepare a draft code of of-
fenses against "the peace and security of mankind. "36 Another com-
mittee was charged with developing a draft statute for the 
establishment of an international criminal court.37 These initiatives 
failed to coalesce, however, until 1989, when Trinidad and Tobago 
suggested the formation of an international criminal court to address 
drug trafficking problems.38 At that point, work on the project in-
tensified, leading to a conference in Rome from june 15 through july 
17, 1998, which resulted in the adoption of the RSICC.39 
The RSICC, which was adopted by 120 signatories,40 provides that 
the ICC, headquartered in the Netherlands, is to prosecute four core 
crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of 
aggression.4I Unlike the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
Hague, which has jurisdiction only over disputes between nations, the 
M /d. at 57. 
32 /d. at 62. 
33 See id. 
54 BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 10. 
35 See generaUy id. at 10-19. 
36 /d. at 11-12. 
37 /d. at 12. 
38 /d. at 16. 
39 SeeBASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 18. 
40 U.S. at Odds, supra note 7. 
41 Ferencz, supra note 3. 
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ICC would have jurisdiction over individuals.42 The Treaty remained 
open for signatures until December 31, 2000, and enters into force 
after sixty nations have ratified it.43 Before December 31, states were 
able to sign the Treaty without ratifying it; after December 31, 
ratification is required in order to sign. 44 In the three years since the 
RSICC was signed, over forty nations have ratified it.45 The United 
States was one of seven nations at the conference in Rome that voted 
against the RSICC.46 
II. U.S. FEARS AND REACTIONS TO THE ICC 
The international community created the ICC because the con-
tinuing practice of establishing temporary ad hoc tribunals was viewed 
as an ineffective method of assuring universal justice.47 Judging from 
the problems of the Tribunals for fugoslavia and Rwanda, it became 
clear that a permanent, effective court with arrest power was needed 
in order to provide notice of the law and to deter international 
crimes.48 The ICC can be effective, however, only if the type of indi-
viduals it seeks to prosecute, such as the former president of Serbia, 
Slobodan Milosevic,49 believe that they can be caught and brought to 
trial. 5° 
A. U.S. Efforts in ICC Development 
The opinion of the international community is that, without the 
participation of the United States, the ICC will be "maimed at birth."51 
42 Chalmers Johnson, When Might Makes Wrong/Americans Are Bold. We Are Brash. And to 
the Rest of the World, We Are Clueless., S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2000, at 1Z1, available at 2000 WL 
6493506. 
43 First Session, supra note 1; Holger Jensen, Bush Facing International Criticism on Trio of 
Foreign Policy Issues, RocKY MTN. NEws, July 14, 4001, at 7A, available at LEXIS, News 
Group File. 
44 ICC Prep Com Shows Progress Despite U.S. Hesitation, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Jan. 
2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
45 At Eighth Session of Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court, Four Working 
Groups Announce Completiou of Assignments, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct.S, 2001, availabk at 2001 WL 
28645411 [hereinafter Eighth Session]. 
46 Ferencz, supra note 3. 
47 Id. 
48 See e.g., Ferencz, supra note 3; MoRTON, supra note 14, at 62. 
49 See Annals of Justice: In l-W!at Court?, TIME, Oct. 16, 2000, at 58, availabk at 2000 WL 
25227420. 
50 See generally Rush to judgment, TIMES (London), Aug. 26, 2000, availabk at LEXIS, 
News Group File. 
51 Id. 
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Most nations desire the inclusion of the United States because it alone 
has the ability to ensure that criminals sought by the ICC are brought 
to trial.52 The United States' participation in the ICC, therefore, 
would provide the credibility and the strength the ICC needs to be 
effective.53 
The United States, however, did not sign the Treaty until Decem-
ber 31, 2000,54 and now threatens not to ratifY and to withdraw its sig-
nature.55 The U.S. delegation at Rome offered to sign if U.S. military 
personnel could be indicted only with the permission of the United 
States, a proposition that was rejected by the other nations.56 What 
concerns the United States is the possibility of U.S. or NATO peace-
keepers being brought before the court if a particular prosecutor 
does not agree with U.S. policy or motives .57 
To ensure that this type of prosecution does not occur, the 
United States sought, unsuccessfully, to require that all ICC cases be 
referred by the U.N. Security Council, of which the United States is a 
member and, therefore, has veto power. 58 With this power, it would be 
less likely that U.S. nationals would be prosecuted. 59 According to the 
United States, Security Council initiation would ensure that only the 
most heinous crimes, such as those committed in Nazi Germany and 
by Saddam Hussein, would be indicted.60 These crimes are of such a 
magnitude, however, that it would be highly unlikely that a U.S. serv-
ice member could be charged.61 
The RSICC allows an ICC prosecutor to start investigations on his 
own initiative, subject to a pre-trial conference with the judges of the 
court.62 The Security Council then can interrupt the process by seek-
52 See id. 
53 See generally U.S. at Odds, supra note 7. 
54 Public Statement, supra note 9. 
55 See Bush Administration Ponders Position Towards International Criminal Court, lNT'L EN-
FORCEMENT L. REP., June 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter Bush Ad-
ministration]. 
56 Anderson, supra note 4. 
57 See Rabkin, supra note 11. 
58 Brett D. Schaefer, Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 537, The Inter-
national Criminal Court: Threatening U.S. Sovereignty and Security (July 2, 1998), available at 
http:/ /www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/shaefer070298.html; see Fred Hiatt, The Court of No 
Resort, WASH. PoST,July 2, 2001, at A17, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
59 Schaefer, supra note 58. 
60 Johnson, supra note 42; Neuffer, supra note 11. 
61 SeeJohnson, supra note 42. 
62 Neuffer, supra note 11; Susan Riggs, The Risks New World Court Poses for the United 
States, REcoRD (New Jersey), Aug. 31,2000, at Ll1, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
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ing a one-year, non-renewable period of deferment.63 The Security 
Council also has the right to quash any indictment, subject to the veto 
of any permanent Security Council member.64 
Concessions were made in the Treaty's development so as to allay 
U.S. fears of unrestricted prosecution of its nationals.65 The ICC was 
given automatic jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against human-
ity, but not over war crimes.66 Since war crimes are the most likely 
category under which U.S. nationals might be charged, this provision 
would ensure that the United States would have the ability to prose-
cute its own citizens without fear that these nationals, specifically serv-
ice members stationed abroad, would be brought first before the 
ICC.67 
Despite these concessions, the United States has not changed its 
position.68 Instead, the United States began to fight a "rearguard ac-
tion" to exempt itself and other non-signatories, including Iraq and 
China, from the jurisdiction of the ICC.69 It did so by trying to ma-
nipulate provisions in the emerging court rules, particularly Article 98 
of the Rules of Procedure of the RSICC.70 
During the three-week meeting of PrepCom held in June 2000, 
debate focused on a U.S. proposal to rewrite Article 98 in order to lay 
the groundwork to "[expand] exemption from prosecutions byway of 
unspecified 'international agreements. "'71 The language proposed by 
the United States for Article 98 read, "[t]he [c]ourt shall proceed 
with a request for surrender or an acceptance of a person into the 
custody of the [c]ourt only in a manner consistent with international 
agreement applicable to the surrender of the person. "72 
63 Neuffer, supra note 11. 
64 Henry Kissenger, The Pitfalls of Universal jurisdiction, FoREIGN AFF., July/ Aug. 2001, 
available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
65 Neuffer, supra note 11. 
66 !d. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 Barbara Cmssette, U.S. Seeks Exemption From New World Court, U.N. Meets Today on Or-
ganizing Issues, S.D. UNION-TRIB.,June 12, 2000, atA2. 
70 See Jim Wurst, Politics: Disagreement Over Meaning of Criminal Court Compromise, INTER 
PREss SERV.,July 2, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
71 Crossette, supra note 69. 
72 Bruce Zagaris, PrepCom to Finish Work on Procedure and Elements of Crime "While Status of 
U.S. to the Court Undecided, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.,July 2000, available at LEXIS, News 
Group File. 
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Thirty-nine of the forty-five delegates felt that this language was 
incompatible with the objects and purposes of the Treaty.73 Compro-
mise was reached, and the Treaty was amended to read as follows: 
2. The [c]ourt may not proceed with a request for the sur-
render of a person without the consent of a sending [s]tate 
if, under [A]rticle 98, paragraph 2, such a request would be 
inconsistent with obligations under an international agree-
ment pursuant to which the consent of a sending [s]tate is 
required prior to the surrender of a person of the [s]tate to 
the [c]ourt.74 
While the United States claimed victory in this rewording, opponents 
of U.S. exemption stated that the United States achieved not a road to 
exemption, but "a winding alley that will lead back to the original 
meaning of the Statute. "75 
According to the United States, the proposal was not an amend-
ment or a modification of the RSICC, but instead was a "procedural 
fix," consistent with the Treaty, which would allow the United States to 
be a "good neighbor" to the court.76 While the United States would 
not be a member of the ICC, it could assist the court as it assisted the 
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals.77 The U.S. proposal would allow it 
and other non-signatory nations to continue to fulfill their interna-
tional responsibilities.78 However, the proposal also would ensure that 
the nationals of U.S.-dubbed "irresponsible nations," those rogue na-
tions for which the ICC was created, still would be subject to the 
court's jurisdiction, presumably because the court would not enter 
into any sort of "international agreement" with those nations.79 
73 Wurst, supra note 70. 
74 Report of the UN. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, 
Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at 89, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/ 
2000/INF/3/Add.1 (2000) [hereinafter Rule 195]. 
75 Betsy Pisik, No War Criminals Here, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at A16, available at 
LEXIS, News Group File. 
76 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks at the "Conflicts and War Crimes: 
Challenges for Coverage" Seminar for Editors Sponsored by The Crimes of War Project 
and The Freedom Forum (May 5, 2000), available at http:/ /secretary.state.gov/www. 
statements/2000/000505.html. 
77 !d. 
78 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Initiative 
on the International Criminal Court (June 13, 2000), available at http:/ /secretary.state. 
gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/ps000613a.html. 
79 See id. 
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The second prong of the U.S. attempt at exemption dealt with 
those international agreements, and was introduced at the November 
meeting of PrepCom,80 held from November 27 to December 8, 
2000.81 This meeting was the last in which nations that had not signed 
the Treaty were able to participate; in effect, it was the United States' 
last opportunity to get its nationals exempted through the language 
of the Treaty itself. 82 
At this meeting, the committee considered the Relationship 
Agreement between the court and the U.N. (Relationship Agree-
ment).83 The Relationship Agreement will deal with the requirements 
on U.N. aid workers, peacekeepers, and officials to share information 
and evidence with the ICC.84 The Relationship Agreement was not 
finalized at that session, however, a finalized draft was agreed on dur-
ing the next meeting of PrepCom in September and October of 
2001.85 
The U.S. proposals for this agreement read as follows: 
The United Nations and the International Criminal Court 
agree that the Court may seek the surrender or accept cus-
tody of a national who acts within the overall direction of a 
U.N. Member State, and such directing State has so ac-
knowledged, only the event (a) the directing State is a State 
Party to the Statute or the Court obtains the consent of the 
directing State, or (b) measures have been authorized pur-
suant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter against the direct-
ing State in relation to the situation or actions giving rise to 
the alleged crime or crimes, provided that in connection 
with such authorization the Security Council has determined 
that this subsection shall apply.86 
However, despite its commitment to exemption at the Febru-
ary/March 2001 PrepCom, the United States did not pursue exemp-
so Wurst, supra note 70. 
81 U.S. Wants Deal Exempting Americans From U.N. Court IJy Dec. 31, Dow JONES lNT'L 
NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000, available atWL 10/18/00 DJINS 23:30:00. 
82 See Wurst, supra note 70. 
83Jd. 
84 Pisik, supra note 75. 
85 See Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Proceedings of 
the Preparatory Commission at its Seventh Session, at 16, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.1/Rev.1/ 
Add.1 (2001); Eighth Session, supra note 45. 
86 Proposed Text of Rule to Article 98 of the Rome Treaty, CICC, available at http:/ /www.igc. 
apc.org/icc/html/U.S.2000.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2000). 
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tion in the development of the Relationship Agreement, choosing 
only to take part in the working group on aggression. 87 Regarding its 
involvement, the U.S. representative stated only that "the U.S. [did] 
not support the ICC; the U.S. was participat[ing] only in the aggres-
sion discussion because of the role of the Security Council; prior ef-
forts to meet the U.S. needs had proved futile; and the U.S. is under-
taking a comprehensive review of the ICC issue. "88 
B. U.S. Legislation 
In anticipation of the U.S. delegation's failure to exempt U.S. 
nationals from the jurisdiction of the ICC, Congress prepared a back-
door escape. In June, 2000, the ASPA was introduced into both houses 
of Congress.89 While Congress took no action at that time, the House 
of Representatives passed the ASPA in March 2001 as an amendment 
to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2002 and 
2003.90 
The ASPA would keep U.S. nationals from ICC jurisdiction essen-
tially by killing the ICC.91 The ASPA has several provisions to ensure 
U.S. exemption.92 U.S. courts are prohibited from aiding efforts to 
extradite any U.S. national to the ICC, and U.S. intelligence is prohib-
ited from sharing information with the ICC93 that either would help 
to exonerate U.S. nationals or to prosecute other war criminals.94 The 
ASPA also cuts off all military and financial aid to any country that 
ratifies the RSICC, except for NATO and other unnamed major al-
lies.95 The President is authorized in advance to use "all means neces-
sary and appropriate" to secure the release of any U.S. national being 
held for trial by the ICC.96 The bill authorizes the rescue service for 
NATO and other major allies as well.97 This provision has led to the 
ASPA being nicknamed the "Netherlands Invasion Act," as it practi-
87 See Bush Administration, supra note 55. 
88 Jd. 
89 Rabkin, supra note 11. 
90 Amendment Passes, supra note 12; seeH.R. 1646, 107th Cong. § 635 et. seq. (2001). 
91 Rabkin, supra note 11. 
92 See id. 
9~ Id.; H.R. 1646 § 634(b)-(d). 
94 Kofi Annan Urges Rfltijication of Rome Statute as U.S. Deliberates its Position, INT'L EN-
FORCEMENT L. REP., Nov. 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter U.S. Delib-
erates Its Position]. 
95 H.R. 1646 § 637(a)-(c); Rabkin, supra note 11. 
96 H.R. 1646 § 638(a); Rabkin, supra note 11. 
97 Jd. 
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cally authorizes the United States to send troops to the Hague to res-
cue U.S. nationals awaiting trial there.98 
Ill. EVALUATION OF U.S. PROPOSALS 
The United States has striven for a world based on a balance be-
tween military strength and international cooperation through de-
mocracy and the rule of law.99 In accordance with that goal, it appears 
that U.S. opposition to the ICC draws its justification from an idea 
that the United States is above international law because of its myriad 
responsibilities in the world.100 While the United States does have 
military responsibilities to the international community, these respon-
sibilities do not justify its opposition to and refusal to participate in 
the ICC. U.S. opposition to both the RSICC, in the form of its pro-
posals for exemption and refusal to ratify, and the ASPA is misplaced 
and has resulted in damage to the United States' reputation as protec-
tor of the world, as well as to its ability to protect itself. 
A. U.S. Proposals for Exemption from ICC Jurisdiction 
Since the RSICC gives countries the option of trying their citizens 
in their own courts, legal experts are puzzled over U.S. opposition to 
the ICC.lOl The United States has court-martialed its own soldiers in 
the past for criminal activities, and there is no reason to believe it 
would not continue to do so.l02 The United States can try almost all 
war crimes committed by U.S. nationals in its own courts, and even 
could enact a law requiring courts to hear cases of nationals who al-
legedly have violated the law of nations as stated in the RSICC.l03 If 
U.S. citizens acting as peacekeepers were ever to commit indictable 
crimes, as did peacekeepers in Ghana,104 and the United States did 
not try them, the United States would suffer a major affront to its 
98 Dave Mcintyre, Prosecute or Invade The Hagu&-That's the Question, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Sept. 15, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
99 Prepared Testimony of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Before the House 
Committee on International Relations, FED. NEWS SERV. (July 25, 2000), available at 
LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter Lawyers]. 
1oo Johnson, supra note 42. 
1o1 Crossette, supra note 69. 
102 See id. 
103 Letter from Benjamin Ferencz, Fears About an International Criminal Court Are Mis-
guided, NJ. LAw ].,June 19, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
1°4 Geoffrey Robertson, Paradox of U.S. Role in Global Justice, CANBERRA TIMES, July 20, 
2000, at 9, available at 2000 WL 23496222. Ghana peacekeepers in Rwanda handed Tutsi 
officials whom they were guarding over to opposition death squads. Id. 
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status as a nation committed to justice, thus making it unlikely that 
such an omission would occur.I05 
The RSICC supports domestic prosecution of war criminals.l06 It 
contains a provision allowing signatory countries to keep their na-
tionals from prosecution for war crimes for seven years, allowing them 
sufficient time to conduct those trials domestically.I07 Countries that 
do not sign the Treaty do not receive the benefit of this privilege.108 
Finally, the ICC is not retroactive. Rather, it can deal only with 
events that happen after the RSICC comes into force, 109 estimated to 
be sometime in 2002.11° Therefore, any past activity by the U.S. mili-
tary that concerns the U.S. government would not fall under the ju-
risdiction of the ICC. 111 Thus forewarned, the U.S. military could de-
velop future assignments with an eye towards the ICC.112 Again, the 
probability of a U.S. service member being involved in a crime of the 
magnitude required for an ICC investigation is not very high.113 For 
these reasons, the U.S. proposals for exemption through Article 98 
and the Relationship Agreement were unwarranted. 
In addition to being unwarranted, the proposals for exemption 
put forth by the United States at the PrepCom meetings were incon-
sistent with the purpose of the Treaty.114 While the new Article 98 
comes with an understanding that it "should not be interpreted as 
requiring new negotiations,"ll5 the very language of this Article could 
suggest otherwise.116 In referring to the ICC's obligations as being 
consistent with "international agreement[s]," the language now in the 
Treaty opens ,the door for the possibility of exemption agreements 
between the ICC and states, and provides a basis "for future negotia-
tions between individual States and the ICC for exclusions under Ar-
ticle 98 (2). "117 This type of continuing negotiation is not what the 
105 See id. 
106 Crossette, supra note 69. 
107 See Neuffer, supra note 11. 
108 !d. 
109 Wurst, supra note 70. 
11o Mcintyre, supra note 98. 
111 See Wurst, supra note 70. 
112 See Lawyers, supra note 99. 
113 See id. 
114 SeeZagaris, supra note 72. 
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Treaty drafters intended, and in fact amounts to an amendment of 
the RSICC_Ils 
Furthermore, the U.S. proposal for the Relationship Agreement 
would have limited the ICC's jurisdiction to requests for surrender, 
making the ICC's ability to try alleged criminals contingent on the 
consent of the state of nationality of the accused or on that of the Se-
curity Council.119 The drafters of the RSICC did not intend for the 
court to be restricted in this manner, therefore, U.S. efforts at exemp-
tion through the ICC language are likely finished.l2° In trying to gain 
an exemption through "international agreement[s]," the United 
States was providing the means for citizens of rogue countries, whom 
the drafters of the RSICC had in mind when they created the ICC, to 
escape prosecution.121 
B. U.S. Circumvention of the ICC Through the ASPA 
The ASPA would do more harm than good. First, its very exis-
tence will surely hurt the U.S. position at the ICC negotiations.122 Sec-
ond, the ASPA effects U.S. national policy objectives by making for-
eign policy and security hostage to the ICC treaty.l23 Finally, the ASPA 
is an unnecessary measure that only would endanger any potential 
future cooperation between the United States and the ICC, coopera-
tion ultimately in U.S. national and security interests.l24 
For the U.S. negotiators to the RSICC who participated in devel-
oping the rules and procedures of the ICC, the existence of the ASPA, 
even before its passage in the House of Representatives, was damag-
ing. Richard Dicker, counsel for Human Rights Watch, called the Act 
"a very ugly face on U.S. diplomacy."125 The harshness of this bill 
weakened the U.S. negotiating position for the November 2000 Prep-
Com meeting.l26 It sent a signal to the ICC that the United States 
118 See Zagaris, supra note 72. 
119 See id. 
120 See id.; Bush Administration, supra note 55. 
121 See U.S. at Odds, supra note 7. 
122 For further information on the U.S. position, see David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at 
Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Pre-
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would not cooperate, thus making the ICC less inclined to work with 
the United States to protect its nationals.127 
In addition, the ASPA could harm national and foreign policy 
objectives.128 The U.S. Department of Defense recognized this prob-
lem, calling the bill "legislative overkill. "129 Since the ASPA requires 
the Security Council to grant ICC immunity to the U.S. military in 
order for the U.S. military to participate in U.N. military activity,130 a 
refusal of such a grant could prevent the United States from using its 
military for international issues which affect its national security.131 
Moreover, the ASPA would hamper the President's powers because his 
ability to send U.S. military forces to participate in peacekeeping ef-
forts, which are often in U.S. security interests, would be restrained by 
the need for a grant of immunity.J32 
Opponents of the bill further argue that above all, the ASPA is 
unnecessary because the ICC deals only with crimes for which U.S. 
service members are unlikely to be indicted.133 The mandate of the 
ICC is to be a court of last resort, stepping in to prosecute the most 
heinous crimes only when a country is unwilling or unable to prose-
cute its nationals.134 The ICC will deal only with the most "egregious, 
planned[,] and large-scale crimes," not "allegations of isolated atroci-
ties."135 The ICC is intended to deal with actions comparable to those 
of the Nazis in World War II, of Pol Pot and Saddam Hussein, or of 
military governments such as those of the 1980's and 1990's in El Sal-
vador, Argentina, Burma, and Indonesia.l36 Thus, it is highly unlikely 
that a U.S. service member ever could be involved in a crime of the 
magnitude necessary to trigger ICC attention.l37 Even if a U.S. na-
tional were to commit this type of crime, the United States would not 
hesitate to prosecute him, as shown by the prosecutions for My Lai, 138 
127 See U.S. Deliberates Its Position, supra note 94. 
128 See Lawyers, supra note 99. 
129 U.S. Deliberates Its Position, supra note 94. 
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and the current investigation into possible crimes committed during 
the Korean War.l39 
In addition, there are extensive safeguards in the ICC system, 
mostly due to U.S. insistence at the original negotiations in Rome.140 
For example, there are strict guidelines for selecting judges and 
prosecutors, as well as an internal system of checks and balances to 
ensure that frivolous cases will not be pursued.l41 The court is in-
tended to deal with countries that lack the ability to mete out justice 
to their nationals, rather than those with complex legal systems like 
the United States.142 The ASPA, therefore, is an unnecessary piece of 
legislation, which will harm not only U.S. relationships with the inter-
national community through the ICC, but also will handicap U.S. na-
tional security and foreign policy decisions.l43 
C. Immediate Ramifications of U.S. Opposition 
U.S. opposition to the ICC has already had consequences. On 
May 3, 2001, the United States lost a seat on the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights.144 Commentators state that this expulsion was the re-
sult of increasing international frustration over U.S. opposition to the 
ICC.l45 
Should the United States decide to withdraw its signature or re-
pudiate the Treaty, as President Bush did with the Kyoto Protocol on 
global warming,146 U.S. signatures on all international treaties would 
be suspect.147 In terms of the ICC, repudiation would cause the 
United States to lose any ability to shape the ICC in its early years.148 
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The United States would not be able to influence the approval of the 
rules of procedure and evidence, or the elements of crimes, nor the 
final language on the relationship of the court to the U.N_l49 Perhaps 
even more importantly, the United States would be unable to partici-
pate in the selection of judges, and would not be allowed to nominate 
a U.S. national for a position.15° Clearly, if the United States should 
decide it is not to be a party to the ICC, the United States would lose 
its chance to participate in the development of "a system of justice 
built not to settle scores, but to affirm the humanity of victims who 
too often are forgotten. "151 
CONCLUSION 
In a speech at Harvard University, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan called on jurists to better educate themselves and their fellow 
citizens about the benefits of the ICC.152 He stated that he did not be-
lieve that U.S. opposition to the ICC stemmed from an opposition to 
punishing those guilty of atrocious crimes against humanity_153 The 
Secretary-General went on to say that all states must live by interna-
tional law, for if they do not, "they are condemned to live by the law of 
the jungle."154 The United States, as the "greatest power on earth," 
could not possibly desire this_155 
The United States may be the world's greatest superpower, but 
this status does not give it an excuse to hold itself above the will of all 
others in the application of international law. U.S. unilateralism no 
longer serves U.S. national interests.l56 Instead, by refusing to be 
bound by rules that the international community supports and by lib-
erally sanctioning nations that have offended it, the United States is 
isolating itself from the international community.157 The United States 
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151 Tom Malinowski, The ICC: An Alliance for justice, WASH. PosT, July 9, 2001, at Al7, 
available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
152 Justice, Not Military Force, Must Rule Secretary-General Asks Harvard jurists To Work for 
Better Understanding of Benefits of International Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 2, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 26607365. 
mid. 
154 Id. 
155 !d. 
156 See Martin Woollacott, It's Time Americans Woke up to the Rest of the Planet: U.S. Foreign 
Policy is Mainly an Exercise in Adhering to the Past, GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 2000, available at 2000 
WL 28346986. 
157 See id. 
176 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:159 
hypocritically believes it has "a right to legislate for the world, but the 
world has no right to legislate for the U.S."I58 
The ICC is designed to eliminate international war-related atroci-
ties. The United States shares those goals and, therefore, has little rea-
son to withhold its support for the ICC. To do so would make a mock-
ery of justice and the idea that no one is above the law.I59 The United 
States cannot use its current status to unilaterally veto that which the 
majority of the world's nations support, and expect that it will not be 
harmed by the result. 
l58Jd. 
159 Asides: America in the Dock, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at A38, available at 2000 WL-
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